Abstract: This article considers New Zealand's accession to the
Introduction
In 2010, at its eighth Summit, New Zealand joined the Asia-Europe Meeting process alongside two other new entrants -Australia and Russia -bringing the number of participants to 48 from an initial 26.
1 New Zealand's path to membership was a long one -15 years from its first expression of interest preceding the inaugural Summit in 1996 until its formal accession. Despite this long timeframe, however, it's accession was in the end something of a rush job, a scramble to respond to events rather than the product of any 
The Long and Winding Road: New Zealand's Path to Accession
The issue of extending membership has always been a thorny one for ASEM. One motivation for the European Union's (EU) initial engagement in the process was its exclusion of Myanmar at a time when conflict over its human rights record had effectively hamstrung cooperation in the EU-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) framework. This raised the prospect that future accessions to the Asia-Europe Meeting would be carefully considered and potentially contentious. Further complicating the enlargement issue was the binary nature of the forum, premised upon two groups cohering around particular identities and effectively requiring that new members be demonstrably European or Asian. This was reinforced by early agreement on a 'double key' approach to expansion, with each side selecting its own members subject to approval by all ASEM states.
New Zealand's approach to ASEM membership was tentative at best. In part this stemmed from prior experience. When Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad had proposed an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in 1990, he had firmly rebuffed expressions of interest from New Zealand and Australia. Consequently, a certain amount of caution on the part of New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) was evident in its approach to ASEM (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012). In the event, such concerns proved to be well-founded. When New Zealand and Australia raised membership prior to the inaugural Summit, the views of Mahathir proved an insurmountable obstacle.
While firm support was forthcoming from the European states, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, opposition from Malaysia and Thailand (Baker 1996, 20; Skelton 1997, 21) meant an effective veto on entry. The key remained Mahathir's opposition which, when filtered through ASEAN's consensus principle, meant that the Association stood as an effective block to any prospect of expanding the forum southwards.
For New Zealand, Mahathir's position led to the shelving of its early ASEM aspirations, a fact reflected in diplomatic communications of the time: 'the key to movement on this issue … remains Prime Minister Mahathir … We believe that any chance we might have of gaining some early concession would not be enhanced by more vigorous representation at this stage which [he] might feel compelled to resist, even publicly' (quoted in Rolfe 2005, 47-8) . In short, the potential benefits of ASEM were considered insufficient to outweigh the effort of campaigning for membership. A conscious decision was therefore made to set aside the ASEM issue until the Mahathir problem had been resolved (interview with senior MFAT official, June 2012).
This cost-benefit calculation became more firmly entrenched over the following decade as MFAT's view of the utility of the process gradually dimmed. As is discussed in more detail below, early interest in membership had been conditioned largely by the expectation that ASEM would deliver substantive results, particularly around trade liberalisation, the failure of which to eventuate reinforced the Ministry's resourcing calculus.
Indeed, the low priority accorded to the Asia-Europe Meeting is evidenced by its total absence from key MFAT documentation of the period. Thus, for example, the 2007 White Paper Our Future with Asia which established a framework for engagement with the region, urging greater integration into the Asian architecture and highlighting the 'need to be included in the new regional structures that are being put in place' (MFAT 2007, 19) Alongside the influence of APEC, ASEM was also the product of the economic concerns of its founding members. The EU's reappraisal of its relations with Asia, embodied in the 1994 New Asia Strategy (European Commission 1994), highlighted the centrality of economic matters in its approach to the region, making clear that the primary factor motivating the push for closer relations was concern at missing out on the growth that was occurring there. Similarly, economic priorities were a motivation for the Asian states, and particularly the members of ASEAN concerned with Europe's turn to its eastern neighbourhood and underpinned by perennial fears that the common market was evolving into a fortress. A link with Europe mirroring the economic and commercially focused tie with the United States embodied in APEC was therefore seen as essential (Pou Seradell 1996, 186-8) . Such institutional proliferation quickly became a characteristic of ASEM, reflecting a form of 'cooperation malaise': the creation of new structures was increasingly a substitute for the anticipated substantive engagement. The result has been the increasing breadth of the process, while depth of cooperation has remained limited and substantive outcomes have failed to eventuate. In part this failure has been the product of a capabilityexpectations gap, with anticipated outcomes being premised upon a level of cooperation that has proven beyond the ability of the ASEM partners to achieve (Doidge 2011, 172-4) .
Additionally, and exacerbating this first difficulty, is the informal nature of cooperation, embodied in the lack of an administrative secretariat, non-binding and consensual decision- ASEM seemed to offer a framework within which a small player like New Zealand could pursue these policy goals effectively. This impetus, however, waned over time: when the process failed to deliver anticipated results, it became devalued in the eyes of MFAT. There was, quite simply, a lack of any sense that ASEM had proved significant, particularly around priority issues for New Zealand (interview with former senior MFAT official, April 2012).
Reinforcing this waning enthusiasm for membership was the issue of resourcing, and the calculation that the cost of engaging in the process to the level likely to be expected by November of that year to address the crisis, the coincidence of the convening of the seventh ASEM Summit in Beijing in the preceding October lent the process added prominence, comprising as it did ten of the European and Asian G-20 members (including the European Commission) (see Figure 1) . 5 The ASEM Summit therefore became a useful preparatory forum for the G-20, and indeed was seen to have been particularly beneficial in generating a level of agreement on issues which could potentially have produced stalemate in discussions (e.g. on IMF and World Bank voting reform) (interview with Commission official, cited in Doidge 2011, 126) . In other words, it was seen as performing something of a clearing house function for the G-20. This seemed to suggest that ASEM was becoming more relevant to global governance, raising the apparent value of forum presence. Indeed it was off the back of the ASEM 7/G-20 concurrence that Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd decided to pursue membership. For New Zealand, too, the Beijing Summit was something of a turning point in its perception of the process, raising the prospect that ASEM would build on this experience to become a useful forum for dialogue on matters of substance (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012). There was therefore a feeling that if such was to be the case, New Zealand needed to be involved (ibid.).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE -LANDSCAPE (CURRENTLY APPENDED TO PAPER)]
Nevertheless, on its own, this apparent increase in the utility of ASEM was insufficient to reverse New Zealand's stance. It was a third element -the membership of Australia -that constituted the trigger. As previously noted, Australia's position was a significant factor for MFAT -so long as Australia was out, New Zealand's non-membership was no cause for concern. The approval of the Australian application by the 2009 FMM left MFAT facing the prospect that New Zealand would be the only regional state not a member of ASEM, a situation deemed untenable (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012).
Asserted McCully: 'We certainly didn't want to be the only East Asia Summit nation not to be there and that would have been the consequences of not joining' (Young 2010 ).
Together, these three elements altered the ASEM calculus for New Zealand: with the incoming National government looking afresh at the country's external engagements, with the seventh Summit raising the prospect that the process would evolve in a useful direction, and with Australia's membership application and acceptance, New Zealand accession became a priority for McCully. Nevertheless, this was not a wholehearted endorsement of the forum: rather than on any substantial belief in the efficacy of ASEM, the decision to join was premised upon a wish not to be absent should the process begin to deliver substantive outcomes (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012). It was a defensive responsemembership as an insurance policy.
New Zealand's Engagement with ASEM
With its accession to ASEM seen as insurance against potential future significance, rather than the product of a clearly articulated view of the forum's value, there was no expectation on the part of MFAT that New Zealand would be a particularly active player (interview with former senior MFAT official, April 2012). Rather, its touch would be a light one -a flag on the table and not much more (ibid.) -an approach requiring a minimal resource commitment while continuing a tradition in New Zealand foreign policy of keeping a finger in every pie (ibid.). Nevertheless, despite this low level of commitment, and the absence of a coherently structured strategy for engagement beyond the minimum, a number of potential benefits of membership are recognised within MFAT. These fall into two broad areas: (i) dialogue and access; and (ii) reinforcing presence.
ASEM as an Arena for Dialogue and Access
Despite continuing rhetoric around substantive engagement, the underperformance of ASEM in this respect has generally been recognised. What has become increasingly evident since its inception, however, is a progressive evolution, a transformation in expectations for the dialogue, moving beyond the initial view that the process should deliver 'concrete and substantial results ' (European Council 1995, 43) and toward a level of satisfaction with its role as a framework for dialogue without preconceptions. As the structure of ASEM has become progressively more dense, it has gained value in the eyes of participants as a political space, an ideational and discursive process, acting as a framework for dialogue, as a filter for global fora, as an arena for socialization and norm diffusion, and as a mechanism for securitisation (Doidge 2011, 142- Beyond this general process, for New Zealand two specific benefits are identifiable, both of which are related to the expansiveness of the dialogue and its broad membership.
The first is the potential use of the forum as a mechanism for addressing priority issues. This The second broader benefit is facilitating access to European and Asian leaders and officials, with the opportunity to arrange bilateral, or even minilateral, meetings in the margins of the various ASEM fora. 6 Most obviously this means gaining access to the larger powers, facilitated by the fact that ASEM is a smaller pond than other fora in which New
Zealand is involved (e.g. the UN General Assembly), but it also means engaging smaller and more peripheral (at least as far as New Zealand is concerned) partners. This is seen to be potentially the greatest single benefit of participation (interview with senior MFAT official, Figure 1) . ASEM therefore provides an opportunity to regularly engage with officials from an array of states with which, cross-accreditations notwithstanding, existing relationships are extremely shallow (interview with senior MFAT official, May 2012), allowing MFAT to increase its understanding of these actors and their priorities.
Nevertheless, the potential benefit to be gained by New Zealand in these respects is currently undermined by the low level of its engagement. The previously noted light touch approach to the Asia-Europe Meeting has limited exposure to the ongoing interaction that could make a reality of the dialogue and access elements highlighted. This is a product of the relative level of importance accorded to ASEM when compared to other fora in which New Zealand participates: more significant for reasons of utility and potential economic benefit are APEC and the EAS, while ASEAN and its associated structures remain the priority 
ASEM as a Tool for Reinforcing Presence
Beyond these dialogue and access elements, ASEM is seen as a mechanism for reinforcing presence, with two components identifiable. The first involves reinforcing the engagement of key partners in regions of significance to New Zealand. Harking back to the foundation of ASEM itself, for example, is the role of the forum in increasing Europe's presence in Asia, and in particular pushing it to spread its focus beyond China (interview with senior MFAT official, June 2012). In this respect, European soft power engagement, including the contribution of ideas and resources on matters of trade, development and integration, are seen to be an important factor in the future security and stability of the Asian region (ibid.).
The presence issue is also, however, conceived in broader terms, with ASEM seen as a means of bringing European and Asian partners into areas of particular interest to New
Zealand. It is a mechanism for cementing the EU not simply into a narrowly defined Asia, but into the wider Asia-Pacific region, and for drawing it and the Asian members further south toward the small island states of the Pacific. Asia-Europe engagement on matters to do with the South Pacific -be it on issues of trade, development, or the environment -is seen to be an important potential outcome of New Zealand's ASEM engagement (ibid.).
The second element is the view that ASEM provides an additional mechanism for reinforcing New Zealand's own presence in Asia, a central goal of its foreign policy strategy.
Alongside the EAS, APEC and the various ASEAN fora, the Asia-Europe Meeting provides a means by which New Zealand can demonstrate its Asian credentials (interview with senior MFAT official, June 2012), making a claim to be a part of the broader Asian caucus (rather than an Asian state), fully integrated into the structures of the region (MFAT 2007, 19) . This has involved the progressive layering of fora within which New Zealand engages with its there is no sense that the allocation of scarce resources will deliver sufficient results.
Nevertheless, these elements can be seen as constituting a bare-bones framework on which to found a more proactive New Zealand strategy, one in which it demonstrates its commitment and resolve to the Asian region while pursuing specific priorities in a manner ideally light on resources. Two areas can be identified:
1. Increasing participation; and 2. Defining and engaging in priority areas where a contribution can be made or benefit gained.
As an underlying requisite, New Zealand must engage more. If it is to gain any benefit from ASEM, and if it is to portray itself to be a 'serious and committed' participant, it must at a very basic level be involved. There are various ways this can be achieved. The most obvious is to attend fora at the senior level, at least some of the time. To a certain extent, the bread and butter of ASEM engagement is the formulation of initiatives, the establishment of meetings and working groups to address priority issues for member states. It is in this framework that the ideational and discursive aspects of ASEM that are increasingly highlighted take place. New Zealand engagement in such structures has, however, been low, and it has so far not proposed any new initiative, 9 a consequence of its reactive rather than proactive approach. While resourcing limitations mean that New
Zealand is unlikely ever to be a major participant in such structures, one or two priority areas may be manageable. And indeed there are a range of issues that would seem ripe for engagement, and for which involvement could usefully extend beyond MFAT to other Ministries or stakeholders (thus, to an extent, defraying costs). Two areas in particular can be identified: (i) education; and (ii) Pacific development.
In 2011, New Zealand hosted more than 97,000 foreign fee-paying students at its secondary and tertiary institutions, 10 70 per cent from its Asian and 9 per cent from its European ASEM partners, generating more than NZ$730 million (US$600 million) for the education sector (MinEdu 2012). ASEM therefore offers a significant opportunity to engage collectively with countries accounting for more than three quarters of foreign students on matters of education. And indeed, the ASEM framework has a history of dialogue on education matters, be this through the ASEM Education Ministers' Meeting held annually since 2008, 11 ongoing seminars on Quality Assurance in Higher Education, or the range of fora targeting matters such as cooperation between the University and business sectors. For
New Zealand, issues such as quality assurance in feeder states are an important element in recruiting foreign students to postgraduate study, as is ensuring the recognition of New
Zealand's own qualification framework, particularly as it relates to private education providers such as language schools. Additionally, ASEM may provide the opportunity to address issues of priority to the New Zealand education sector including, for example, the provision of offshore education services, a core element in its international education strategy (see e.g. MinEdu 2011). Encouraging the participation of the Ministry of Education could therefore be a useful mechanism both for increasing engagement without drawing heavily on MFAT resources, and for addressing priority issues around New Zealand's international education strategy.
Secondly, ASEM may be useful as a mechanism for addressing New Zealand's regional concerns around the issue of development. ASEM is a constructed reality, and the enlargement of its Asian caucus has, to an extent, involved a progressive redefinition of the region, at least as far as engagement with Europe is concerned. This has involved a transformation from an Asia of great powers and Tiger economies, to one increasingly inclusive of developing countries, and it is this transformation that has seen the issue of development emerge on to the forum's agenda (Holland and Doidge 2012, 176) . Zealand's level of engagement, however, is the performance of ASEM itself, and its ability to deliver substantive cooperation. Ultimately, therefore, when it comes to New Zealand's role in the Asia-Europe Meeting, as one MFAT official commented, 'we'll just have to suck it and see' (interview with senior MFAT official, June 2012). 
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